



Directorate of  
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# **Terrorism Review**

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**8 December 1983**

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GI TR 83-025  
8 December 1983

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**Secret****Terrorism  
Review**

8 December 1983

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*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy  
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

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**Terrorism  
Review**

8 December 1983

**Perspective*****What Next for the Abu Nidal Group?***

Iraq has recently expelled Abu Nidal and dismantled his group's Baghdad operation. If Iraq's severance of ties with the terrorist group that it has nurtured and employed since 1974 is permanent, changes in the group's leadership and sponsorship may portend increased dangers to US interests.

In the past, Abu Nidal has found that working for more than one patron allows him to maintain a certain amount of independence. Iraq's move, however, forces the group to rely solely on Syria for both financial and operational support, as well as safe haven. Not surprisingly, the group has been shopping around for a new sponsor to offset Syrian aid.

Over the past two years, the Abu Nidal group is known to have been in sporadic contact with representatives of the Iranian Government.

We have not yet seen any evidence that Iran has agreed to support or sponsor the group. Undoubtedly, the Iranian Government is hesitant to collaborate with a group that in the past worked so closely with the Saddam Husayn regime. Furthermore, there is no shortage of radical Shiite groups and individuals anxious to carry out whatever nefarious operations Iranian officials can dream up; Iran therefore has no need to become involved with a secular group like that of Abu Nidal. Nevertheless, Abu 'Isa may believe—may even have been given reason to believe—that attacking US interests will help the group win Iranian aid.

Traditionally, the Abu Nidal group has refrained from targeting US interests. Apparently, Abu Nidal did not view such attacks as helpful to the Palestinian cause. US presence and policies in Lebanon may now lead him to change his mind. Alternatively, Abu Nidal's leadership may have been eclipsed by that of his deputy, Abu 'Isa. We are almost certain that Abu Nidal has left Baghdad, but we

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have no information indicating he has shown up in Damascus. He may have gone elsewhere. [REDACTED]

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Elsewhere in this issue, a persuasive case is made that Abu Nidal is not simply a hired gun, attacking at the whim of his patrons. This reasoning may not apply to Abu 'Isa, about whose motivation we know almost nothing. Judging by the limited information available so far, however, Abu 'Isa may be much more inclined than Abu Nidal to attack US interests. It is unsettling to contemplate that he may soon be responding to Iranian direction. [REDACTED]

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## Highlights

### Alert List

**Lebanon: Terrorist Threat to US Interests Remains High.** The terrorist threat to US interests in Lebanon remains high and shows no sign of abating soon. The continuing factional strife in the country and the involvement of Syria and Iran suggests that US facilities or personnel could be attacked by any one of a number of groups. [REDACTED]

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### Key Indicators

#### **West Germany: Possible Terrorist Collection Effort.** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] suspected terrorist sympathizers who are employed as taxi drivers in the Kaiserslautern area. Some of these drivers have apparently entered Ramstein Airbase and have commented that it is "easy to scout out the base." Although there is no specific information suggesting that an organized collection effort in support of a terrorist act is under way, it cannot be ruled out. [REDACTED]

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**Lebanon: Prisoners Released by Israelis.** The Israelis claim that several dozen "known terrorists" were included in the approximately 4,500 prisoners they released in exchange for the freeing of six Israeli prisoners. Many of those released remained behind in southern Lebanon where they may pose a threat to Israeli forces. Some may move north and reinfiltate the area in and around Beirut, where they could increase the risk to MNF forces [REDACTED]

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**International: ASALA-RM Outlines Strategy.** The 28 November edition of the French news magazine *Le Point* carried an interview with Monte Melkonian, a former ASALA member who is emerging as the spokesman for the Revolutionary Movement wing of ASALA—a splinter group formed in August 1983 to protest ASALA's indiscriminate bombing campaign. Melkonian outlined the three basic objectives of ASALA-RM:

- Continued attacks on Turkish targets in Turkey.
  - Discontinuation of attacks counterproductive to the Armenian cause.
  - Identification of Turkish Government allies as "enemies of Armenians."
- Melkonian specifically warned that the group's first attack would be in Turkey but did not exclude attacks on Turkish targets in other countries that have large Armenian communities. To date, ASALA-RM has conducted no attacks, but we

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believe the emergence of Melkonian—suspected of involvement in several terrorist attacks—as a leader of this splinter group indicates attacks by ASALA-RM in Turkey may be imminent [redacted]

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**Significant Developments**

**United Kingdom: Protesters Penetrate Cruise Missile Base.** Four protesters penetrated Greenham Common and claimed they had reached the missile bunkers without being detected. UK officials deny that they were able to reach the missiles. The break-in was the first since the missiles arrived. [redacted]

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**West Germany: Intruders Damage Pershing II Transporter.** Four individuals broke into a US Army camp near Mutlangen and used sledgehammers to damage a Pershing II transporter. Mutlangen is widely believed to be the site for the first INF deployment. [redacted]

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**Colombia: President's Brother Kidnaped.** On 22 November, President Betancur's brother, Jaime Betancur Cuartas, was kidnaped at the Catholic University in Bogota, where he is dean of the law school. In telephone calls to various media offices, the National Liberation Army (ELN) claimed responsibility for the abduction. The group issued a list of 10 conditions for Betancur's release, including economic and social reforms, the release of political prisoners, and punishment for members of the paramilitary group Death to Kidnapers (MAS), and threatened to execute their prisoner if the government did not meet the group's demands. The ELN later reduced their demands, stating that Jaime Betancur would be released if the government authorized a march for peace in the capital on 7 December. Political sources attributed the reduction in demands to adverse public reaction. Wire services announced that Betancur was released unharmed early on 7 December. [redacted]

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***Bolivia: Parliament Building Bombed.*** During the predawn hours of 24 November, a powerful bomb exploded outside the Bolivian National Congress building, causing extensive damage but no injuries. Bolivian police arrested a member of the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant group of President Siles's Nationalist Revolutionary Party of the Left (MNRI) in connection with the incident as he was fleeing the scene of another bombing attempt the same day. In the suspect's home, police discovered documents, weapons, and the same kind of explosives used in the attack on the Congress. The evidence is not yet conclusive, but additional suspects in the bombing may include persons at the top levels of the Bolivian Government. In recent weeks, a series of bombings have taken place at media offices in La Paz and other major cities, with no group claiming responsibility. The bombings likely are related to the intensive coup plotting against the Siles government by groups on both the right and left.

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**Abu Nidal:  
Mercenary or Revolutionary?** ☐

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For the past 10 years, Sabri al-Banna, better known as Abu Nidal, has been mounting terrorist attacks—chiefly assassination attempts—against Israeli and Jewish targets, PLO interests, and installations and officials of moderate Arab governments. The diversity of his targets, the lethality of his attacks, and the geographic reach of his operatives—who have mounted attacks in more than 25 countries—have made Abu Nidal one of the most formidable international terrorists in recent history. ☐

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Abu Nidal's organization has always depended on the support of patron states. Many of his operations have involved official (if covert) assistance of one sort or another from the governments of these states. And some of these operations have been directed against opponents or enemies of these states. Consequently, although he has justified his actions as necessary to the ultimate success of the Palestinian revolution, Abu Nidal has often been described as a terrorist mercenary—a hired gun. ☐

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Does Abu Nidal mount operations at the behest of his patrons because he needs their support, or do his patrons support him because they like his operations? The answer to this question might help us assess the likely future role of Abu Nidal in the aftermath of the rebellion against the moderate leadership of the PLO. Because Abu Nidal never appears in public and only rarely discusses either his motivations or his intentions, we must seek clues to his future by examining his past. ☐

expelled the PLO forces from the country, greatly reducing their ability to mount attacks directly against Israeli targets. Only in Lebanon did the Palestinians still enjoy relative freedom of action. ☐

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**Roots in Black September**

In the late 1960s Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Syria began trying to suppress Palestinian military activities in their territories. They felt threatened not only by the presence of so many armed PLO Fedayeen (fighters), but also by the possibility of Israeli retaliation for permitting the Fedayeen to stage attacks into Israel. In September 1970 the Jordanian Army attacked and

In response to the Jordanian action, Fatah formed the Black September Organization, a covert terrorist arm of the Special Operations Branch of its intelligence organization Jihaz al-Rasd, headed by Arafat's deputy Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad). Black September mounted a number of spectacular attacks in Europe and the Middle East, including the massacre of 12 Israeli

athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games and the 1973 seizure of the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum during which several diplomats, including the US Ambassador and his deputy, were murdered. [ ]

Such events drew condemnation from around the world. Even in many Arab capitals, Palestinian terrorism was deplored as counterproductive. Saudi Arabia temporarily suspended its financial aid to the PLO. Yasir Arafat, among others, was coming to view the Palestinian association with terrorism as incompatible with efforts to portray the PLO as a viable political entity with which the West could induce Israel to negotiate a settlement. According to official statements made in 1974, in mid-1973 the PLO leadership ordered the deactivation of Black September and instituted a ban on international terrorist attacks (with the exception of attacks against Israeli targets in Israel and the occupied territories). [ ]

[ ] Abu Nidal fiercely opposed this new policy. He believed the PLO could do without support from the Saudis, whom he considered reactionaries, and he accused the moderates of selling out the interests of the Palestinians in order to preserve their own positions. On 3 September 1973, exactly one year after the Munich operation by Black September, Abu Nidal defied Arafat's ban in a way that explicitly conveyed his contempt both for the moderates and for their concern for Saudi aid. Acting under Abu Nidal's instructions, five Palestinians from Iraq seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris, taking 13 hostages whom they tried unsuccessfully to trade for Abu Da'ud, who was in prison in Jordan. Subsequently, the PLO expelled the recalcitrant and unrepentant Abu Nidal for insubordination. [ ]

#### **Fatah—the Revolutionary Council**

Abu Nidal's radical views found favor with the Iraqi regime, which helped him build up a group of supporters that he called Fatah—the Revolutionary Council, a name demonstrating his belief that his organization, rather than the one led by Arafat, was the true Fatah. Following the adoption of a moderate program by the Palestine National Council in July 1974, Abu Nidal attracted a considerable following among youths and militants from the ranks of Fatah and other Palestinian organizations who heeded his assertions that there

was no longer any place in the PLO for them. We have no solid information concerning the size of Abu Nidal's group, but estimates have ranged as high as 500. [ ]

In October 1974, having discovered a plot by Abu Nidal to assassinate Yasir Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and other PLO officials, the PLO sentenced him to death and demanded his extradition from Iraq. Instead, [ ] the Iraqi Government provided financial and logistic support as well as a safe haven for Abu Nidal and his group. Baghdad also allowed the group to operate a training camp and published its anti-Arafat propaganda in Iraqi public media. Abu Nidal began publishing his own magazine under the name *Falastin al-Thawra (Revolutionary Palestine)*, the same name used by the PLO for its monthly magazine. Despite Abu Nidal's fiery rhetoric, however, until the middle of 1976, only one international terrorist incident was attributed to his group—the hijacking of a BOAC airliner from Dubai to Tunis in November 1974, in an effort to obtain the freedom of 15 imprisoned Palestinian terrorists, including those who had been involved in the Khartoum affair [ ]

At the same time, Abu Nidal began building up a network of operatives and supporters in other countries. [ ] he recruited many of his operatives from among Palestinian students studying abroad, sometimes involving them in operations after only perfunctory training. [ ] has established small cells of supporters in various European countries including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. We do not know whether they have operational roles in addition to their support roles. [ ]

#### **The Black June Organization**

In June 1976 Syria sent troops into Lebanon to fight alongside the Christian rightists against the Muslim leftists and their Palestinian allies. A furious Abu Nidal renamed his group the Black June Organization and, with the enthusiastic support of Iraq, began attacking Syrian interests. During the last four months of 1976, Black June leapt to world prominence by staging five terrorist attacks in five

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countries, four against Syrian targets. A certain consanguinity between Black September and Black June was suggested when the responsibility for several of these attacks was claimed in the name "Black June and September." [redacted]

After a period of near inactivity—with only one attack in 1977—between January and August 1978 Black June conducted five more attacks, again, each in a different country. Four were attempts to assassinate moderate PLO officials; the fifth was a skyjacking that ended in the deaths of 16 Egyptian soldiers during a bungled counterterrorism assault at Larnica Airport near Nicosia. [redacted]

In 1978 opposition to the Camp David accords led to a modest rapprochement among Iraq, Syria, and the PLO, making it no longer appropriate for Iraq to sponsor, support, or even permit the staging from its soil of terrorist attacks against Syrian or PLO interests. At the same time, Iraq was beginning to feel international pressure to restrain Abu Nidal. And late in the year Abu Nidal suffered a serious heart attack. Whether Baghdad clamped down on Black June operations because of the changed situation or Black June stood down from its operations because of its leader's incapacitation, during the next 16 months no international terrorist attacks were attributed to Abu Nidal's group. [redacted]

Early in 1980 Black June went back into action, striking four times in seven months, with each attack once again coming in a different country. Neatly demonstrating the range of Abu Nidal's enmity, the targets were, in order, a French Arab, a Spanish Jew, a moderate Palestinian official, and an Israeli diplomat. These attacks were followed by another lull in activity, this one lasting nine months. [redacted]

#### A New Patron

By early 1981 [redacted]

[redacted] Black June had set up an office in Damascus and was receiving support from Syria. Considering the group's previous targeting of Syrian interests, and considering that Abu Nidal was apparently still spending most of his time in Baghdad, these reports were hard to believe at first, but subsequent events have eliminated all doubt. For one thing, the

group has for the most part avoided using the name Black June, presumably because Syrian support has made it impolitic to continue commemorating Syrian perfidy. Instead, it has used a variety of names, such as al-'Asifa (the Storm)—a name also used by Fatah to denote its fighters. [redacted]

In May 1981 the Abu Nidal group launched another campaign of terrorist violence, attacking a wide variety of targets in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Some of the attacks had major repercussions, such as the attempt in June 1982 to assassinate the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, which triggered the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that led to the dispersal of the PLO. Lately, the group has been targeting Jordanian interests in retaliation for Amman's recent arrests of a large group of Abu Nidal's operatives. [redacted]

#### More Than a Mercenary

Of the more than 50 terrorist attacks known or suspected to have been committed by Abu Nidal's operatives since 1974, nearly 40 were aimed at moderate PLO officials or their supporters and at officials of various Arab states. By contrast, fewer than 10 targeted Israeli or Jewish interests, and the first of those did not take place until 1980. Although this imbalance might imply that Abu Nidal harbors more enmity toward Arab moderates than toward the Israelis, the savagery of many of the anti-Israeli attacks belies such an assessment. [redacted]

Some of the attacks in the current campaign may have been in the interests of the Iraqi regime—for example, those directed against officials of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which had been edging toward neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. Others have appeared to benefit the Syrian regime, especially those directed against targets in Jordan, which had been trying to mobilize support for Arafat and his beleaguered forces. On the other hand, both Jordan and the UAE—indeed, most of the moderate states which Abu Nidal has attacked—had previously incurred his personal enmity by arresting and imprisoning or executing his operatives. [redacted]

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The group has never been implicated in an attack that did not in some way serve Abu Nidal's conception of Palestinian interests. Even during the period when his group was almost exclusively dependent on support from Iraq, for instance, Abu Nidal conducted no attacks against Iraq's primary enemy, Iran. Similarly, Abu Nidal has not attacked the Muslim Brotherhood, the main domestic opposition to the Assad regime and a principal target of Syrian terrorism. The fact that Abu Nidal has been able simultaneously to obtain support from two traditional enemies has often been cited as evidence that he is basically a mercenary. A more likely explanation, however, is that he is loath to become dependent on just one patron state, since that would narrow his options and maneuvering room. [redacted]

[redacted] Iraq recently expelled Abu Nidal and dismantled his Baghdad operation, leaving his group solely and uncomfortably dependent on Syria. [redacted]

[redacted] the group apparently anticipated this development and has been seeking Iranian support. [redacted]

#### Implacable Consistency

At bottom, the proposition that Abu Nidal has been acting mainly out of mercenary motives is not tenable. If Abu Nidal were fully responsive to the needs and goals of his patron states, they would be employing his minions not only against the enemies they temporarily happen to share with him but against their primary enemies as well. A close examination of the circumstances under which Abu Nidal has switched sides shows, moreover, that it was never his group which changed its goals or strategy but rather his patrons which changed theirs. Although it has been obscured by the variety of his targets, operations, and patrons, in retrospect Abu Nidal has been implacably consistent in his strategy of opposing moderation in the Middle East by trying to kill those who espouse it. That is the mark not of a mercenary, but of a genuine revolutionary. [redacted]

[redacted]

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## Escalating Terrorism in the French Antilles: Increased Concern in Paris

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The rash of 17 coordinated bombings throughout the French Caribbean last May, the bombing of the US Consulate General on Martinique in November, and the subsequent spate of bomb attacks on Guadeloupe were probably carried out by the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC). According to US Embassy and Consulate General sources, the ARC is apparently a fusion of separate "armed liberation groups" based in the three French Caribbean departments. The most recent of these attacks, which caused 23 injuries, reflects an intensification of violence and a new disregard for injury to bystanders. Paris believes the changed tactics are intended to force the French hand on the issue of Caribbean independence. Local departmental councils have mobilized public demonstrations against the violence, and officials in France have dispatched 100 specially trained gendarmes to reinforce local security forces and track down the terrorists.

French officials credit the escalating violence to frustration born of economic stagnation, illegal immigration—which stimulates unemployment—and the slowness of the French Government's "decentralization" process. The Mitterrand government blames domestic and Caribbean critics of its attempts to grant more autonomy to the Caribbean departments for tying up decentralization in the French courts. Although the ARC and some French newspapers blame the most recent violence on the US intervention in Grenada, Paris probably has no illusions that US actions will influence significantly either the frequency or level of ARC violence.

ARC was organized by Marxist elements within several Caribbean independence parties. Although these groups have openly condemned the violence, they have nevertheless sympathized with the terrorists' goals. The ARC, moreover, is widely believed to have sufficient resources to prosecute an even more ambitious campaign of terror.

According to press reports, it is suspected of having participated in the bombing of the Defense Ministry and Socialist Party Headquarters in Paris in August.

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According to the US Embassy in Paris, French officials are concerned about indications of foreign support for Caribbean terrorists. Jacques Fournet, the Ministry of Interior's Secretary for Overseas Territories and Departments, recently stressed to US officials that Paris suspects outside influences on and support for the ARC and other "autonomist" groups in Martinique and French Guiana.

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French policymakers are probably concerned that growing tension and violence in the independence movements of the Antilles will prove both troublesome at home and embarrassing abroad. Most of the population of the French Antilles and many conservative Frenchmen oppose independence for both nationalistic and economic reasons. They look for support to a 1954 law that declared overseas departments to be "integral" parts of France. Any move to speed up the process of independence will probably arouse a storm of protest from Mitterrand's domestic opposition and

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may even provoke some discord among centrists and moderate Socialists on whom Mitterrand depends for support.



The terrorist actions underscore Mitterrand's failure to fulfill his electoral promise to grant independence and create other thorny problems that Paris will find difficult to manage. On the one hand, Mitterrand is confronted by demands from the French public and Caribbean leaders to suppress the terrorists. On the other, he probably fears that dispatching large numbers of gendarmes to get tough with the ARC may provoke charges of "neocolonialism" in the Third World and even among the leftists of his own Socialist Party.



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**Secret****Uruguay: Tupamaros Reappear in  
South America** 

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Uruguayan leftist Tupamaros are involved in guerrilla activities in other South American countries probably will be used by the Uruguayan military and intelligence service to justify strengthening their capabilities and could further complicate plans for the return to civilian rule. These reports have heightened fear in the Uruguayan Government of a resurgence of the leftist subversion that brought the military to power in 1973.

Although the majority of Uruguay's military leadership favors a return to civilian rule in 1985, President Alvarez is seeking to perpetuate himself in office by exploiting the armed forces' fear that civilians would allow renewed leftist activity. The military is united in insisting on a free hand to deal with any future guerrilla threat, and Alvarez may be able to use these recent reports to justify the types of political restrictions that have proved to be a stumblingblock in recent military-civilian talks on the transition process.

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Earlier this year the Guatemalan Interior Minister publicly voiced concern that the Tupamaros were helping to organize terrorist groups in various parts of Latin America.

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**Gourgen Yanikian:  
Godfather of Modern  
Armenian Terrorism**

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*A long-delayed act of vengeance by a 77-year-old man in 1973 became the inspiration for a wave of Armenian terrorism that continues today and has spread worldwide.*

In that year, Gourgen Yanikian, a retired Armenian engineer, haunted by memories of having watched while most of his family was slaughtered in Turkey some five decades earlier, lured the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles and his aide to the Biltmore Hotel in Santa Barbara, California, and shot them. At his trial, Yanikian refused to acknowledge that his act had been criminal, claiming to have killed the diplomats in just retaliation for the deaths in 1915 of 24 of his family members. He also used the occasion to draw world attention to the massacre by the Turks of nearly 2 million Armenians.



Gourgen Yanikian.

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This isolated act by an apparently deranged individual—and the subsequent publicity surrounding a campaign to obtain his parole—became the springboard for Armenian terrorism throughout the world. Between October 1973 and February 1975, Armenian terrorists claimed four separate bombing attacks against Turkish diplomatic installations in the United States and the Middle East. They used a variety of names—the Yanikian Commandos, the Yanikian Group, and the Prisoner Yanikian Group—linked to the “martyr” Yanikian. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia—in a communique announcing its creation in Beirut in 1975—acknowledged its debt to Yanikian, calling him the godfather of modern Armenian terrorism. It pledged to lead the struggle to gain an Armenian homeland and to retaliate against Turkey for the Armenian “genocide.” The rightist Armenian terrorist group, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, began its campaign of assassinations and bombings against Turkish diplomats and facilities the same year. In the past decade, 27 Turkish diplomats have been killed by Armenian terrorists.

Armenian radicalism today is still being fueled by events surrounding Yanikian. His supporters are seeking an early parole—March 1984—for the senile, deaf, and ailing man who has been used to symbolize the victimized Armenian nation. He represents a rallying figure for attempts to gain acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide and political efforts to secure an Armenian homeland. Yanikian’s solitary act of vengeance 10 years ago set in motion a savage campaign that shows no signs of abating.


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## Statistical Overview: International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-83

■ Total, 1119  
 ■ Of which: US targets, 516



| Category of International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-83, by Month | Total              | 72 | 90 | 52 | 59 | 47 | 50 | 57 | 59 | 77 | 82 | 59 | 66 | 71 | 60 | 56 | 86 | 76 | 1119 |
|--|--------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|
|  | Kidnaping          | 4  |    | 1  | 4  | 3  | 2  | 2  | 4  | 4  | 3  | 3  | 2  | 3  | 6  | 3  | 1  | 7  | 52   |
|  | Barricade, hostage | 1  | 1  | 6  | 1  | 5  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 2  | 2  | 3  | 1  | 3  | 8  | 4  | 49   |
|  | Bombing            | 40 | 32 | 13 | 17 | 18 | 23 | 22 | 25 | 27 | 30 | 22 | 32 | 22 | 22 | 17 | 19 | 26 | 407  |
|  | Armed attack       |    |    | 2  | 1  |    |    |    | 2  | 2  | 4  | 1  | 2  | 3  |    | 2  | 1  |    | 20   |
|  | Hijacking          | 3  | 4  | 1  | 3  | 3  | 1  | 4  | 6  | 3  | 4  | 7  | 6  | 10 | 3  | 2  |    | 1  | 61   |
|  | Assassination      | 3  | 4  | 5  |    | 1  | 2  | 4  | 1  | 4  | 5  | 2  | 4  | 2  | 3  | 3  | 4  | 2  | 49   |
|  | Threats, hoax      | 19 | 44 | 18 | 23 | 14 | 16 | 20 | 15 | 29 | 25 | 18 | 17 | 24 | 23 | 23 | 37 | 32 | 397  |
|  | Sniping            | 1  | 2  | 3  | 2  | 1  |    | 1  | 2  | 1  | 2  |    |    |    | 1  | 1  | 3  | 2  | 22   |
|  | Other <sup>b</sup> | 1  | 3  | 3  | 8  | 2  | 4  | 3  | 2  | 4  | 5  | 4  | 1  | 4  | 1  | 2  | 13 | 2  | 62   |

<sup>a</sup> Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

<sup>b</sup> Break-ins, conspiracies, shootouts, etc.

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## Chronology

*This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received.* [REDACTED]

**26 October 1983****Spain: US Firm Bombed**

In Bilbao, the Basque leftist group Iraultza claimed responsibility for the bombing of a Westinghouse factory. No one was injured in the incident. [REDACTED]

**Late October 1983****Colombia: Kidnaped US Citizen Released**

Catherine Woods Kirby, who was kidnaped on 8 April by individuals presumed to be members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), was released unharmed after a ransom of more than \$50,000 was paid. [REDACTED]

**15 November 1983****Sudan: French and Pakistani Nationals Kidnaped and Released**

Seven French and two Pakistani employees of a French company working in Sudan were abducted by the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army. They were set free on 19 November. [REDACTED]

**Sudan: British Nationals Abducted and Released**

Two British employees of American companies were abducted by Anya Nya guerrillas south of Bentiu. They were subsequently released and found on a road by a Sudanese patrol on 17 November. [REDACTED]

**Brazil: Sao Paulo Newspaper Offices Bombed**

A car containing a time bomb exploded in the parking lot of the building housing two of the larger newspapers in Sao Paulo. No injuries were reported, no group has claimed responsibility, and speculation as to the motive for the bombing varies widely. [REDACTED]

**16 November 1983****France: Bombing Claimed by Direct Action**

In Paris, Direct Action (DA) claimed responsibility for the bombing of a Catholic Church organization building, apparently in retaliation for the sentencing of DA leader Frederick Oriach to a five-year prison term. [REDACTED]

**France: Bombing of Church Facility**

In Paris, a bomb damaged a second church facility in a late-night explosion. No group claimed credit for the attack, although the similarity of the target and the late hour of the attack indicate that this attack also may have been carried out by Direct Action. [REDACTED]

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**Colombia: Bombing at Medellin University**

A powerful bomb exploded in the administration building of the university, causing more than \$200,000 in damage. The building houses the university's computers, which were badly damaged in the blast. Anonymous phone calls to the university had stated that a bomb had been planted, but a search operation conducted by city explosives experts failed to turn up the bomb. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident. [REDACTED]

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**Spain: Bombing Campaign Against US Companies Continues**

In San Sebastian, the Basque terrorist group Iraultza claimed credit for the bombing of the Coca Cola bottling plant, which caused considerable damage but no injuries. Iraultza had claimed credit for two bombings of US-affiliated companies only four days earlier—all in protest against the US intervention in Grenada. [REDACTED]

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20 November 1983

**West Germany: State Criminal Office Bombed**

In Duesseldorf, an explosion caused moderate damage, but no injuries. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the attack may be connected to the ongoing trial of leftwing radicals who carried out militant acts during Vice President Bush's visit to Krefeld last summer. [REDACTED]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

21 November 1983

**Spain: Terrorist Extortion**

Spanish police have developed information that the Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) is attempting to extort "revolutionary taxes" from doctors and lawyers. ETA's attempts over the past few years to collect such taxes from banks have met with only limited success. Police suspect that flooding in the Basque region during September probably damaged ETA's weapons caches, forcing the group to seek new sources of funds to replace the weapons. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Burma: Explosion in Rangoon**

Three children were killed and 10 people hospitalized when a bomb, found by one of the children in a sidewalk drain, exploded. Authorities recovered a second unexploded device. Because the drain was near a bus stop, it appears the bombs were being hidden there for later use; we do not know who placed them. [REDACTED]

25X1

22 November 1983

**Corsica: Bomb Attacks**

In Ajaccio, five bombs exploded within minutes of each other, causing minor damage to four private homes and a bank, but injuring no one. Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, we believe the outlawed separatist group, the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC), was responsible. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

**South Africa: Power Pylons Damaged by Bombs**

Two power pylons were slightly damaged by bombs that exploded in the Durban township of Kwamashu, causing minor power outages. No one has claimed credit for the incident. Power pylons are a favorite target for sabotage because they are relatively unprotected and damage to them causes major disruptions. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Colombia: French Consul's Son Kidnaped**

According to news reports, the son of the French honorary consul in Monteria, Cordoba Department, was kidnaped by members of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). No ransom demand has yet been made. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Colombia: President's Brother Kidnaped**

President Betancur's brother, Jaime Betancur, was kidnaped by individuals claiming to be members of the National Liberation Army (ELN). Initially, the group issued a list of 10 demands, threatening to kill their prisoner if they were not met. The group subsequently reduced their conditions for Betancur's release to one: government authorization of a march for peace in Bogota on 7 December. Wire services announced that Betancur was released unharmed early on 7 December. [REDACTED]

25X1

**23 November 1983****Berlin: Explosion at the Wall**

The explosion occurred on the West Berlin side of the Wall, although it was technically within East Berlin territory. There was no structural damage, but several parked cars in the vicinity were hit by debris. [REDACTED]

25X6

25X1

**24 November 1983****Bolivia: Parliament Building Bombed**

A powerful bomb exploded outside the Bolivian National Congress building, causing extensive damage but no injuries. Police have arrested a suspect in the bombing who may have ties to some of President Siles's close government advisers. [REDACTED]

25X1


**25 November 1983****Bolivia: Lufthansa Manager Released**

The Lufthansa Airlines General Manager for Bolivia, who was kidnaped on 14 November by a previously unknown group calling itself 10 November, was released unharmed after his abductors were paid a \$1.5 million ransom. A West German counterterrorist unit participated in investigating the incident. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

Secret



25X6

**Austria: Neo-Nazis Arrested**

Austrian police arrested well-known West German neo-Nazis Michael Kuehnen and Thomas Brehl. They are to be deported. An investigation is under way to determine the Austrian contacts of the two individuals. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Burma: French Couple Released by KNU**

The Karen National Union (KNU) released a French couple who had been kidnaped on 18 October from a cement factory being constructed with French aid at Myainggale. The KNU had threatened to put the couple on trial unless France terminated all assistance to Burma; however, France reportedly did not meet any of the KNU demands. In a press conference held to publicize the release, the KNU president repeated his warning to foreign aid workers to leave Burma, and the KNU defense minister reportedly claimed that "no more foreigners will be captured alive." The group has significant capability to carry out terrorist attacks on foreign targets. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Guatemala: University Rector Murdered**

The Acting Rector of San Carlos University was murdered by two assailants on motorcycle who opened fire with automatic weapons as he left his parked car in a university parking lot. The evidence suggests that the operation was carried out by the left; university sources speculate that the victim's success in preventing radicals from politicizing the campus may have been motive for the killing. [REDACTED]

25X1

26 November 1983

**Chad: Grenades Thrown at Zairian Ambassador's Residence**

Two grenades were thrown into the front yard of the Zairian Ambassador's residence. One exploded, slightly wounding a guard. There have been some arrests, but we do not know the identity of those reportedly detained. The Zairian Embassy had received anonymous phone threats for the past two months. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Bolivia: Journalists Union Building Bombed**

A bomb explosion caused substantial damage to the Oruro journalists union headquarters building. No casualties were reported, and no group has claimed responsibility for the bombing. In recent weeks, unidentified terrorists have staged bombing attacks against several newspaper offices in major Bolivian cities. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Spain: Killing Claimed by Basque Terrorists**

In Vitoria, the military wing of ETA claimed credit for the shooting death of a nightclub owner. The terrorists' communique charged that the victim was the leader of an extreme rightist group—Fuerza Nueva—as well as a drug trafficker and police informant. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

Secret

28 November 1983

**Italy: Sentences Handed Down in Terrorist Trial in Milan**

In one of Italy's largest guerrilla trials ever, more than 100 leftwing terrorists and their supporters were sentenced to prison terms for their involvement in an urban guerrilla campaign that terrorized Italy during the 1970s. The convicted were given sentences ranging from one month to more than 30 years; an additional 20 defendants were released. Defendant Marco Barbone—who admitted involvement in gunning down Italian journalist Walter Tobagi and whose confessions led to the arrest of about 50 other terrorists—received a relatively lenient eight-and-a-half-year sentence and was freed pending his appeal. [ ]

25X1

**Guatemala: Guerrilla Safehouse Raided**

Security forces raided a guerrilla safehouse in Guatemala City where they found license plates, explosives, and Marxist literature. Witnesses report that the authorities apprehended some of the subversives, but Guatemalan officials deny that any guerrillas were captured [ ]

25X1

**Colombia: Mormon Churches Bombed**

Eight bombs exploded before dawn in two Mormon churches in Bucaramanga, causing \$100,000 in damage. No injuries were reported. Based on evidence found at the scene of the bombings, local police suspect the National Liberation Army (ELN) to be responsible. [ ]

25X1

29 November 1983

**Italy: Another 210 To Stand Trial in Milan in Connection With Terrorist Campaign**

Recent press accounts indicate an additional 210 people accused of hundreds of crimes, including murders, woundings, and robberies that occurred in the Lombardy region during the 1970s, will stand trial in Milan. The defendants are alleged to belong to the Prima Linea terrorist group or the related Revolutionary Communist Committees. [ ]

25X1

30 November 1983

**Singapore: Bomb Threat**

The Marine guard received a bomb threat from an unidentified local male who claimed a bomb had been placed in the USIS area. A suspicious box turned up by a search proved to be harmless. [ ]

25X1

**Corsica: Bombing Spree**

The Corsican separatist group National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) is believed responsible for 16 bombings on the island, including one against Ajaccio's law courts. No one was injured in the attacks, believed to be in protest against a visit by the French Interior Minister that was scheduled for 1 December. [ ]

25X1

**Greece: Bomb Threat Against Hellenic American Union**

A bomb threat was received at the Hellenic American Union (HAU), but a search by HAU security guards failed to turn up any explosives. [ ]

25X1

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Secret

1 December 1983

**Corsica: Bombings Continue**

In Bastia, a bomb damaged the Bank of France only hours before French Interior Minister Gaston Defferre arrived for an official visit. Although no group claimed credit for the attack, we believe the FLNC was responsible. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Philippines: Explosive Device Found at US Embassy**

A parcel containing a homemade explosive device was left by an intruder who escaped after he was detected by a US Embassy guard. The bomb was successfully disarmed by local authorities. No one has claimed responsibility. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X6

2 December 1983

**Spain: Bombing Attacks Against US Targets**

In the Basque country, eight US facilities were the targets of bomb attacks, which we believe to be the work of the Basque separatist group Iraultza. Iraultza has claimed credit for one of these attacks—the bombing of the Hispanic-American Cultural Society in Bilbao. During the past two years, Iraultza, which opposes private foreign investment in Basque territory, has claimed responsibility for several attacks against US targets. Iraultza has conducted its attacks during the late-night hours and has targeted only property, avoiding any personal injuries. The recent bombings constitute a significant increase in activity by this group and, based on Iraultza's communiques, are probably linked to US involvement in Central America [REDACTED]

25X1

**Greece: Firebombing of UK Diplomatic Vehicle**

An automobile belonging to the UK Ambassador's secretary was firebombed in the early morning hours. The car had an official license plate and was parked near the residence of a US Embassy secretary. According to Embassy reporting, Greek police believe the firebombing was an anti-American action because the car had "XA" plates, which are generally associated with US-owned vehicles. No one has claimed responsibility for the firebombing. [REDACTED]

25X1

3 December 1983

**Portugal: Bombings Claimed by FP-25**

In Lisbon, the leftwing clandestine group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) claimed responsibility for bombings against two banks that caused damage but no injuries. FP-25—named for the date of the 1974 Portuguese revolution—also was responsible for two bombings in Lisbon last month following almost a year of inactivity. No motive for the recent attack was given by the anonymous telephone caller who claimed credit for the bombings. [REDACTED]

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